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Cognitive and Institutional Barriers to New Forms of Cooperation on Environmental Protection: 
Insights from Project XL and Habitat Conservation Plans. 
 
Abstract 
Many perceive the predominantly command-and-control structure of regulatory policy to be 
overly restrictive and inefficient in achieving our emerging environmental goals. In response, the 
U.S. government has introduced several voluntary programs to develop innovative, beyond-
compliance environmental management solutions through the collaboration between government 
agencies and regulated entities. Yet, these programs have not gained widespread acceptance. 
This paper analyzes the cognitive and institutional barriers to that acceptance by looking 
specifically at two programs - Project XL and Habitat Conservation Plans. These barriers act out 
of force of habit, creating a resistance to change and a rejection of new forms of regulatory 
policy. We argue that to create policy change, we must change how individuals think and how 




While legal standards have achieved impressive gains in environmental protection and 
wildlife conservation since the 1960s (Easterbrook, 1995), some argue that the methods they 
employ are out of date with contemporary environmental problems and that such standards are 
becoming increasingly inefficient in achieving our emerging environmental goals. Existing 
standards and enforcement programs are perceived to be too rigid and restrictive to foster the 
type of private innovation (rather than mere compliance) that is required to identify and 
implement solutions that are both environmentally and economically sustainable (Schmitt, 1994). 
Believing that we are rapidly approaching the point of diminishing returns on command-and-
control environmental regulation, many see the existing policy regime as possibly the greatest 
obstacle to continued environmental improvement.  
In response to these concerns, the U.S. government has introduced a host of voluntary 
programs that are designed to foster collaboration between government agencies and regulated 
entities on the development of innovative, beyond-compliance environmental management 
solutions. The objective of such programs is compelling: to uncover ways for regulated entities 
to save money and achieve higher environmental protection standards than are guaranteed by 
existing regulations. Unfortunately, adoption of these programs has been slow. This paper 
introduces two examples of such voluntary programs in the areas of pollution control and 
wildlife habitat conservation—Project XL and Habitat Conservation Plans, respectively—and 
explores cognitive and institutional barriers to their successful adoption in the private sector. 
 
Background 
The predominant regulatory policy regime over the past thirty years has been a 
command-and-control structure where regulatory agencies set the standards to which 
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corporations must adhere under threat of penalty (Hoffman, 1997). It is a top-down approach that 
many critics see as heavy handed. These legal standards often lock organizations into a focus on 
strict legal compliance rather than the attainment of environmental goals (Tenbrunsel, Wade-
Benzoni, Messick, and Bazerman, 1997). Once standards are written, program managers within 
both government and industry become constrained by a compliance mindset and bureaucratic 
procedures which attenuate the creative search for more economically and environmentally 
efficient choices that might deviate from the standard. A given rule structure dictates which 
pollutants and sources to control, to what extent, and with what technologies across a broad 
spectrum of disassociated industries. Thus, standard-based systems define the incentive systems 
for individuals and promote self-interested and expedient behavior that interferes with over-
arching organizational as well as societal interests (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Messick, and 
Bazerman, 1997). Creativity goes unrewarded and individuals just "follow the rules." 
But alternative regulatory programs are now being proposed that employ a negotiated 
form of compliance tailored to the needs and potentialities of individual organizations and 
environmental contexts. This new approach is "characterized by a new kind of legal self-
restraint…[which] restricts itself to the installation, correction, and redefinition of democratic 
self-regulatory mechanisms" (Teubner, 1983: 239). Cooperative environmental policy 
fundamentally reconfigures the role and objectives of both oversight agencies and the regulated 
community. Instead of mandating environmental policy, regulators seek out the input and 
participation of other parties with site-specific knowledge about the nature of environmental 
problems they encounter and the potentially innovative solutions available to resolve them. 
These may include regulated private sector organizations, non-profit organizations, scientific 
communities, local and state governments, community organizations and others. Through 
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negotiation among these interested parties, corporations gain the flexibility to define which 
emission sources to control through site-specific compliance strategies that achieve broadly 
defined objectives (Schmitt, 1994). Cooperative environmental policy strives to reward pro-
active companies for seeking competitive advantage through environmental innovation beyond 
regulatory standards (Fiorino, 1999). 
This paper considers cooperative regulation as an opportunity for creating value for all 
interested parties in a setting that recognizes both their competing and complimentary interests. 
The goal is to maximize environmental gain while minimizing economic costs (both in legal 
confrontation and operational reconfiguration). However, this balance is contrary to the 
historically predominant view of the relationship between environmental protection and 
economic growth. Over the past thirty years, environmentalists and business/development 
interests have fought a zero-sum battle where environmentalists have tried to strengthen 
regulations and business/development interests have attempted to weaken them. This zero-sum 
confrontation is represented as a "win-lose" environmental negotiation as depicted in Figure 1 
(Hoffman, Gillespie, Moore, Wade-Benzoni, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1999). In this view, 
environmental gains cannot be achieved (moving from the southeast, point B, towards the 
northwest, point C) without incurring economic costs. (See Thompson (2001) and Bazerman 
(2002) for review of how parties frequently fail to create value in negotiation because of a 
myopic focus on value claiming.)  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Unfortunately, while parties are fighting this zero-sum battle to enhance or weaken 
environmental legislation, the result is often intractable positions and inefficient regulation. 
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Opportunities to develop wiser legislation - better for environmental and economic interests - are 
lost. Voluntary programs, such as Project XL and Habitat Conservation Plans, offer a model for 
negotiations that could realize value-creating and efficiency enhancing trades by improving upon 
rules that are very costly to economic interests and minimally beneficial to the environment with 
innovations that produce cost reductions and environmental gains. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
these programs enable the parties to make a mutually beneficial move from point X to point Y 
and to transform the regulatory relationship from a win-lose to a "win-win" scenario. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
We would not want to suggest, however, that the path from point X to point Y is a direct 
one. Economic and environmental interests are in both a competing and complimentary 
relationship. Figure 3 merges Figures 1 and 2 creating a "mixed motive" situation. While the 
stated goal might be to move from point A to point D, a more realistic representation of the 
negotiation is depicted by the move from the B-C line to E-F line, where mutual gains are 
maximized but not necessarily evenly divided.  
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
In this paper, we will analyze some of the reasons why programs that shift from a 
command-and-control regulatory mode to negotiated arrangements encounter resistance. We 
focus specifically on two programs in the areas of industrial pollution control and wildlife 
conservation, Project XL and Habitat Conservation Plans respectively. Project XL (eXcellence 
and Leadership) is a program that allows individual exemplar companies to have greater 
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flexibility in achieving the environmental objectives of the myriad of environmental regulations, 
provided that they reduce discharges below current regulatory standards. Habitat Conservation 
Plans (HCPs) are an emergent type of regulatory variant that offers landowners an opportunity to 
negotiate compliance with the Endangered Species Act while still retaining more commercial 
control of their land. Neither program involves modifying existing environmental standards but 
allows companies an alternative compliance process which they can negotiate on a voluntary 
basis. Each program calls for a form of negotiated agreement necessitating new forms of 
cooperation — not only between the government and the regulated community, but also among 
environmentalists, scientists, community representatives and others. In our view, these new 
programs involve shifts in thinking that conflict with both the cognitive biases of those involved 
in the process and the institutional biases of the organizations and systems in which they are 
embedded. In the rest of this paper we will elaborate on the mechanics of these programs and 
discuss the cognitive and institutional barriers to developing them effectively. 
 
Reinventing Regulatory Policy: Encouraging Cooperation 
While regulatory reform has been an initiative of every president since Gerald Ford, it has met 
with limited success (Weidenbaum, 1997). Most recently, in 1996, the Clinton Administration 
pledged the goal of “reinventing government” by re-evaluating the overall regulatory process 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 1996). One of the primary initiatives of this effort, developed 
under the National Partnership for Reinventing Government (formerly the National Performance 
Review), began the task of replacing command-and-control regulation with service-based and 
innovation-oriented programs. In particular, the initiative focused on four tasks: eliminating 
obsolete regulations; rewarding environmental results that cut red tape; creating grass roots 
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partnerships rather than Washington based federal efforts; and negotiating with the regulated 
community rather than dictating standards (National Performance Review, 2000). Elaborating on 
this latter task, the federal government set out to encourage consensus-based rule making, to 
improve regulatory science and to encourage more innovative approaches to regulation (National 
Performance Review, 1993a, 1993b). The Clinton Administration anticipated that Project XL 
and the use of Habitat Conservation Plans, designed around the objective of fostering 
cooperation through negotiation, would serve as exemplars of the reinvention initiative. 
 
Industrial Pollution Control and Project XL 
The Environmental Protection Agency regulates industrial pollution through a wide 
variety of regulations covering various media and sources. These laws are based on a command-
and-control format, are segmented by media (such as air, water, hazardous waste, etc.), and are 
generally in the form of uniform technology requirements based on what is the best presently 
available. Yet, the complexity and level of control of these regulations has grown to unwieldy 
proportions over their thirty-year history. Observing deep and fundamental flaws, the Mellon 
Foundation charged that "the system’s priorities are wrong, it is ineffective in dealing with many 
current problems, and it is inefficient and excessively intrusive … The future system should be 
results-oriented, integrated, efficient, participatory, and information rich" (Davies and Mazurek, 
1997: 48). 
In response to such criticism and the President's call for reinventing government, the EPA 
has set itself on a series of “high-priority and significant actions aimed at improving the current 
regulatory system and laying the groundwork for a new system of environmental protection.” 
These efforts are designed to “achieve better environmental results through the use of innovative 
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and flexible approaches to environmental protection,” by promoting private sector innovation, 
increasing community participation and making "it easier for businesses to comply with 
environmental laws by offering them compliance assistance and incentives to prevent pollution 
at its source” (US General Accounting Office, 1999: 22-23). One prominent example of this 
initiative is Project XL. 
Introduced in May 1995, Project XL is intended to foster cooperation between the EPA 
and regulated companies in the development of more cost-efficient and effective environmental 
protection. It is a pilot program with the explicit agenda of supporting projects that produce 
innovations that are transferable to other facilities. To be eligible, companies must demonstrate 
that through environmental management or technological innovation they can produce "superior 
environmental performance” (SEP) as compared to a baseline projection from the status quo. The 
project must produce private and regulatory cost savings, be supported by stakeholders, and 
avoid shifting safety risks to other potentially affected parties (US EPA, 1999). In essence, the 
EPA offers regulatory flexibility with accountability in exchange for new learning, beyond-
compliance environmental management, and stakeholder involvement. Approval of an XL 
permit considers the compliance history of the applicant firm, the input of affected parties (e.g., 
community groups, and local and national environmental interests), and monitoring protocols 
that keep the agencies and other stakeholders abreast of project performance through a regular 
reporting scheme (Robertson and Jett, 1999).  
Unfortunately, Project XL's success rate has been mixed. The number of projects 
approved and implemented has fallen short of EPA's initial learning and reengineering 
objectives. While there are nearly 27,000 facilities that release hazardous and toxic materials 
(those filing Toxics Release Inventory Reports with the Environmental Protection Agency), only 
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three XL projects were proposed in 2000. As shown in Figure 4, the number of approved XL 
projects remains low and agency representatives are searching for ways to gain greater 
involvement in the program from the regulated community. 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
Endangered Species Protection and Habitat Conservation Plans 
Similar to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of the Interior and 
Commerce have been undertaking regulatory reform in the area of endangered species 
protection. The Endangered Species Act (ESA), often seen as one of the powerful, yet inflexible 
and controversial regulatory programs (Lowry, 2000), provides another opportunity for 
reinventing government. Enacted in 1972, the Endangered Species Act prohibits the “take” of 
any federally listed animal or plant species considered “endangered” or “threatened” on public 
and private lands. To “take,” as defined in the ESA, means to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, collect or attempt to engage in such conduct” (ESA, Section 3(18)). 
This includes any habitat modification that impairs species reproduction. The prohibition on 
taking protected species has traditionally resulted in the imposition of severe land-use 
restrictions.  
Overall, critics of current ESA implementation charge that it has public costs in terms of 
excessive administration, enforcement, and litigation as well as private costs in terms of 
diminished property rights. For private development interests, restrictions on their lands appear 
to violate sacrosanct private property rights without just compensation. Critics of the program 
argue that this imposition causes landowners to oppose species protection as contrary to their 
own economic interests. The ESA, for example, imposed major restrictions on the timber 
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industry with the listing of the northern spotted owl in 1991. For the timber industry at large, a 
long protracted battle with the government ensued, resulting in some relaxed restrictions for 
smaller timber companies (Westneat, 1996) but significant restructuring of the northwest 
industry as a whole.  
This adversarial conflict creates private incentives that are contrary to the objectives of 
species protection, for instance, to destroy species habitat for fear of government intervention or, 
in the words of one landowner, “shoot, shovel, and shut up” (Crismon, 1998). The case of Ben 
Cone is an the example of a logger who sustainably managed a 10,000-acre tract of timber in 
South Carolina until the 1991 ESA listing of the red cockaded woodpecker threatened the 
commercial use of his property. Due to the presence of a couple dozen woodpeckers, his land 
was subject to harvesting restrictions on 1,560 acres. To avoid further restrictions, Cone clear-cut 
major portions of his remaining property (Baden, 1995). Although an exaggerated case, this 
highlights how adversarial conflict on species protection can harm both private and public 
interests. 
Private participation is necessary for species protection to be successful. According to the 
United States Government Accounting Office (GAO), more than a third of the 1,000 animal and 
plant species listed as endangered can be found only on private property (Cohn, 1998). There is 
also a growing consensus among biologists that we must move away from an orientation towards 
individual species protection and press instead for more holistic habitat conservation (Noss, 
O’Connell and Murphy, 1997). This shift increases the need for private interest participation in 
species protection because habitats know no boundaries between public and private lands.  
In an effort to foster private interest participation and develop solutions beyond 
traditional methods of command-and-control species regulation, reform efforts have promoted 
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the use of Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). Congress introduced HCPs in 1982 as an 
amendment to the ESA under Section 10(a)(1)(B). The intent of Congress was to integrate a 
broad-based ecosystem-oriented planning mechanism into the objectives of species protection 
while also creating greater regulatory certainty for private landowners in the future in exchange 
for enhanced habitat conservation. Specifically, an HCP allows for the “incidental taking” of 
endangered species in exchange for a commitment by the landowner to provide a more extensive 
habitat design intended to provide enhanced protection for the species over a longer time horizon 
(U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, et. al., 1996).  
However, for the first ten years of the program, HCPs saw little use (Noss, O’Connell and 
Murphy, 1997). It has only been since 1995, with the encouragement from Secretary of the 
Interior, Bruce Babbitt under the Clinton administration that plans in excess of 1,000 acres were 
proposed and HCPs emerged as a planning tool consistent with the original intent of Section 10. 
Overall, HCPs have met with only moderate success. Shown in Figure 5, the government has 
approved only 250 HCPs since 1983. These include several large acreage plans for timber 
companies including Weyerhaeuser, Plum Creek Timber (a detailed analysis of the Plum Creek 
Bull Trout HCP can be found in Troast, Riley, Hoffman, and Bazerman, 2000), Pacific Lumber, 
International Paper, Union Camp, and MacMillian-Blondel. While some have lauded these HCP 
initiatives, others see them as a means for the industry to circumvent the ESA (Cohn, 1998). As 
with Project XL, HCPs have yet to be fully accepted as a new form of cooperation and neither 
have achieved the level of adoption hoped for by policy reform advocates. In the next section, we 
will consider obstacles in gaining their acceptance. 
 




Obstacles to the Adoption of Project XL and HCPs as the Dominant Design 
Despite the as yet unrealized potential of these programs, the concept of negotiated 
outcomes remains an attractive alternative to the command-and-control aspects of regulation. 
Through Project XL and HCPs, the government acts as “collaborator” rather than arbiter of the 
rules (Skocpol, 1985), working with business to develop better pollution control or habitat 
conservation through negotiation rather than top-down control. These programs offer a new 
architecture that emphasizes performance-based systems (that specify desired outcomes) rather 
than technology based standards (that prescribe methods of compliance) while more effectively 
engaging the broader community (Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen, 1999). Logically, this would 
appear to be a better alternative than protracted compliance battles that fill overcrowded court 
dockets. In a collaborative arrangement, business, government and others can increase the 
knowledge base that will improve environmental principles and practices over the long term.  
Project XL and HCPs represent a new platform for policy implementation, a competing 
policy design to the presently dominant structure of command-and-control. We are presently in a 
period of discontinuity in which the existing regulatory systems are seen as inconsistent with 
emerging goals or objectives that seek to satisfy both environmental and environmental 
objectives. These new programs can be seen as variants in the challenge to become the 
"dominant design"(Anderson and Tushman, 1990) in industrial pollution control and endangered 
species protection. Their emergence represents the beginnings of a transition from an era of 
incremental change based on the status quo to an era of ferment (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) 
where competing designs seek market acceptance and legitimacy. The ultimate dominant design 
will emerge among the competing models promoted by rival organizations, strategic alliances 
and governmental regulators (Tushman, Anderson, and O’Reilly, 1997). Hence the process is 
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strategic, political, and social with organizations entering the process and attempting to direct its 
outcome. The obstacles to this process must also be seen in this way.  
Resistance to the acceptance of programs like Project XL and HCPs come from years of 
history and practice that take the form of cognitive and institutional inertia. We argue that to 
create policy change, we must change how individuals think and how institutions guide that 
thinking. Both individual cognition and societal institutions act by force of habit, creating 
resistance to change and a rejection of new forms of regulatory policy. They present 
psychological and cultural constraints, which alter individual and organizational perspectives on 
issues such as pollution control and endangered species protection. To move beyond them, we 
must consider the interplay of varied organizational actors, and the contending logics, authority 
structures, and conflicts that occur among them (Ventresca and Washington, 1998). Conceptions 
of the value of endangered species protection, the sanctity of a pristine environment, the 
responsibility of the corporation toward protecting them and, the role of the government in 
motivating such action are all mediated by individual cognition and societal institutions 
(Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999). Only by identifying the core, taken-for-granted beliefs (or 
myths) that reside on both of these levels can we understand the persistence of inefficient 
regulatory designs and the barriers to new and more efficient forms of cooperation. 
 
Cognitive Barriers to Efficient Environmental Cooperation  
Negotiators representing environmental and economic interests often reach solutions that 
are not on the efficient frontier as depicted earlier in Figure 3 because of the assumption that they 
have opposing interests. Bazerman (1983) labeled this assumption the “mythical fixed-pie,” 
highlighting the failure of negotiators to find mutually beneficial trades as a result of the myth 
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that what is good for one party is bad for the other party. As noted earlier, this is a maladaptive 
assumption in environmental disputes. Bazerman and Hoffman (2002) argue that the mythical 
fixed-pie is particularly strong in the environmental arena as a result of the mistrust and 
antagonism between parties. Furthermore, highly charged emotional issues, typified by 
environmental versus economic disputes, often create additional biases - such as pseudo-
sacredness and egocentrism - that exacerbate the fixed-pie assumption. We will discuss each in 
turn. 
The mythical fixed pie reduces the possibilities for beneficial trades. The fixed-pie 
assumption creates tremendous cost to the disputants, the environment, and society. Bazerman, 
Moore, and Gillespie (1999) used the false logic of the fixed-pie to explain the inefficiency in the 
case of hazardous waste dumps and Superfund laws (CERCLA). Toxic waste clean up is a 
complex problem, offering a range of alternative approaches, yet, the fixed-pie perspective is 
typical among protagonists. One article advocating tighter regulation of hazardous waste dumps 
declared, “We must pass an effective Superfund law. If the polluters win, then we lose—our tax 
money, our environment, and our health” (Pandya, Rosenfeld, and Caffee, 1998). Yet, the 
government and industry have spent more on legal costs to fight over Superfund cleanup liability 
than it would have cost to clean up the sites. Obviously, these actions are not on the efficient 
frontier.  
The mythical fixed-pie prevents disputants from cooperating to integrate their interests. 
Negotiators may not be opposed to trade-offs, and identifying trade-offs can be quite easy when 
negotiators seek them. Yet, negotiators fail to identify them because of the assumption that the 
parties' interests are perfectly opposed. The fixed pie assumption may be the most formidable 
barrier our mind erects to wiser environmental agreements. Thompson and Hastie (1990) found 
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that sixty-eight percent of negotiators studied expected no opportunities for mutual gain or for 
reaching an integrative agreement. This is a false assumption in virtually all complex 
negotiations, and is certainly false for all negotiations with Project XL and HCPs. But, growing 
the pie requires the exchange of information. Experimental negotiation research suggests that a 
greater exchange of information would allow business and ecological interests to generate wiser 
environmental agreements as it is consistently related to improved negotiation performance (e.g., 
Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, and Carroll, 1990). After reviewing thirty-two negotiation 
experiments, Thompson and Hrebec (1996: 405) conclude “remarkably few people provided or 
sought information about the other party’s interest during negotiations (about 20% and 7%, 
respectively).” 
The mythical fixed pie results from the tendency of people to overgeneralize purely 
competitive situations instead of seeing them as mixed-motive situations. Bazerman (1983) 
suggests that the fixed-pie assumption is rooted in social norms that lead us to interpret most 
competitive situations as win-lose. Furthermore, many of our judgmental strategies become 
institutionalized as our organizations adopt the competitive mindset of competitive individuals 
(Bazerman, 1983), making it difficult to create sustained change in individuals, groups, or 
organizations. For example, lawyers play a critical role in environmental disputes, as a high 
percentage of environmental disputes are either resolved in the courtroom or against the 
backdrop of pending legal action. Unfortunately, the dominant orientation of the American legal 
system is win-lose and extremely competitive, and trades are likely to be lost (Bazerman, Moore 
and Gillespie, 1999). The parties in environmental disputes assume that the core issue is tougher 
or stronger regulation, and miss opportunities for wiser regulation.  
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Pseudo-sacredness exaggerates the claims among the parties. Creating the trades to 
overcome the mythical fixed-pie is exacerbated by a (often false) perception that issues in 
environmental negotiations are sacred. Environmentalists take positions that no tree should ever 
be cut in a National forest, while landowners take the view that no one has a right to tell them 
what can be done on their land. Both parties treat their issue as sacred, and miss the wise trades 
that can be created through mechanisms such as HCPs and Project XL. Critics of HCPs have 
shaped their arguments in the context of the sacredness of any endangered species, thus 
questioning a program that supports the incidental taking of some species. In an editorial that 
appeared in The Seattle Times, members of RIDGE, a local environmental group posed the 
question: “Can ecosystem destruction be compensated? Or mitigated?” (Fraser and Belew 1996). 
The answer was "no." The claim of sacredness eliminates the possibility for any discussion that 
would allow the discovery of possible trades. Bazerman, Moore, and Gillespie (1999) and 
Thompson and Gonzales (1997) recognize that there are issues that a party would never trade 
under any realistic circumstance, but argue that there exists another group of issues that are 
labeled sacred, but for which the potential for trade does exist. 
Egocentrism creates different views of fairness. Another important cognitive barrier to 
creating wise trades is the psychological tendency to see the fair resolution of a dispute in a way 
that is favorable to one’s interests. Egocentrism is a self-serving bias in one’s honest assessment 
of what would be fair (Messick and Sentis 1985; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, and Bazerman 
1996). Wade-Benzoni et al. (1996), for example, show that much of the problem in fisheries 
crises is that the multiple constituencies each simply want what is fair, but have very different 
notions of what would constitute a fair settlement. As a result, each constituency harvests that 
amount of fish they believe they are entitled to, and collectively, too many fish are taken. 
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Cognitive barriers often lead to mistrust. Collectively, the mythical fixed-pie, pseudo-
sacredness, and egocentrism create an environment of mistrust, as each competing interest 
believes its own views, and lacks the ability to find creative trades. Mistrust becomes another 
barrier. Citrus juice manufacturer Jack M. Berry, Inc. was the first Project XL candidate the EPA 
approved approximately one year into the program. A government case analysis of the project 
described how company and government negotiators overcame long-established mistrust to build 
a working partnership:  
 
The industry routinely looks at government as a threat. Berry employees often felt 
intimidated by government personnel, fearing they might give the wrong answer or 
cause a violation and lose their job. The project succeeded in eliminating this 
intimidation; employees are now comfortable talking with government personnel. No 
other company in the industry thought the Berry project could be done. … The project, 
however, succeeded in proving teamwork is possible and makes sense. It is important 
to be open and flexible with people in order to build trust. The dynamics of people 
working together is very important in this kind of project (US EPA, 1998b: 35). 
 
Collectively, we see the mythical fixed-pie, pseudo-sacredness, and egocentrism as 
cognitive barriers exacerbating the problem of informing protagonists to use new institutions that 
help grow the pie of resources. We do not see these barriers as insurmountable, but we do 
believe that they need to be dealt with in order to institutionalize new and improved ways of 




Institutional Barriers to Efficient Environmental Cooperation 
Beyond the level of the individual, resistance to new forms of cooperation can emerge 
from institutions (Scott, 1995) embedded within organizations and social structures. Institutions 
are the laws, rules, protocols, standard operating procedures and accepted norms that guide 
organizational action. Scott (1995) distills theory and empirical research on institutions into three 
foundational pillars: regulative, normative, and cognitive aspects. Regulative aspects of 
institutions are based upon legal sanction to which organizations accede for reasons of 
expedience. Normative aspects of institutions are morally grounded, to which organizations will 
comply based on social obligation. Cognitive aspects of institutions reference the collective 
constructions of social reality via values, language, meaning systems, and other rules of 
classification embodied in public activity (Zucker, 1983). These three aspects are operationally 
intertwined (Scott, 1995; Hirsch, 1997) and are present in all forms of institutional control 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). So, while Project XL and HCPs may represent shifts in the 
regulative elements of institutions, they trigger deeper institutions in the normative and cognitive 
levels. At these levels we can begin to see the sources of conflict and resistance to their adoption. 
In this section, we will analyze seven.  
The shifting role of government as negotiator rather than arbiter of the rules. 
Regulation characterized by a command-and-control relationship establishes the government as 
the arbiter of the rules (Skocpol, 1985). In this role the government can be seen as dictating what 
is best for the environment and the public, rather than facilitating collaborative problem solving 
with industry. This role is considered appropriate by society for exercising power and insuring 
appropriate behaviors within industry (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This is the established order 
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and the shift from command-and-control to negotiated self-control involves new sets of values 
based on a new level of trust within government for the regulated community.  
Project XL and HCPs represent a revolutionary value change in the government’s 
regulatory relations (Environment Today, 1995). In order for cooperative regulatory programs to 
build creative partnerships, trust emerges as a critical component of the collaborative process 
(Ruckelshaus, 1996). Trust is a salient institutional concept conferring legitimacy on the 
evolution of formal social structures (Zucker, 1986) and is an essential component in 
collaboration for the efficient exchange of information (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Wasserman 
and Galaskiewicz, 1994). Government must trust industry as a partner in working towards the 
common objective of efficient environmental protection (Marcus, Geffen and Sexton, 2002).  
However, historically adversarial relations coupled with a deeply entrenched belief in the 
mythical fixed pie create resistance to change. The US government has traditionally shunned 
creating the kind of cooperative regulations that are evident in Asian and European economies. 
Voluntary information sharing and regulatory flexibility are at the heart of Project XL and HCPs, 
yet both are anathema to traditional industry- regulator relations. For these programs to achieve 
their objectives, former regulatory adversaries must discard long-entrenched positions to take on 
new roles as negotiators, partners, and public facilitators in environmental management. John 
Kessler, director of EPA’s emerging sectors and strategies division, observed early in the 
program that, due to the novelty of the Project XL concept, these were roles that both sides had 
to learn as they enacted them. Lingering suspicions and deep cultural rifts added to the challenge 
of reinventing company, government and stakeholder relations (Jones, 1996). As one editorialist 
quipped: “Does anyone truly believe that any government bureaucracy - especially one so deeply 
suspicious of the regulated community, an agency that measures its worth by its annual tally of 
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convictions of environmental miscreants - would actually be willing to bargain away its 
birthright?” (Harris, 1996a: 4). The notion of giving up this form of control as well as the idea of 
"negotiating" environmental improvements may appear to some as contrary to what they 
associate with the proper purpose and role of the government. 
The shifting role of industry as environmental strategist and policy entrepreneur. 
The concept of developing “creative partnerships” implies the use of new collaborative 
institutions to assist in reinventing regulation. More importantly, this new partnership requires 
that the regulated community adopt a new role of seeking out innovative ways to protect the 
environment that are complimentary and even enhancing of their strategic and economic 
interests. The collaborative process offered by Project XL and HCPs are designed to encourage 
managerial strategic action by industry entrepreneurs in terms of both promoting private 
environmental innovation and private involvement in policy development. Programs like Project 
XL and HCPs are attempts to promote environmental leadership in a way that merges a firm's 
economic and environmental interests. However, the command-and-control and adversarial form 
of environmental regulation has historically stymied a proactive approach to innovation within 
the private sector (Porter and van de Linde 1995).  
Beyond individual firm strategy, these programs are designed to incent the regulated 
community into shifting from opposing environmental policy to actively taking part in its 
formation. There is tremendous risk in this shift given the uncertainties of the ultimate policy 
outcome. By participating in cooperative compliance programs, they become proactive 
entrepreneurs in leading institutional change (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Encouraging private 
industry leadership through this dual shift in roles is critical to providing legitimacy and 
encouraging dominant designs in environmental policy (Troast, Hoffman, Riley, and Bazerman, 
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2000). Environmental innovation, like all technological innovation, requires an intimate 
understanding of the problem and potential solutions and therefore is best driven by general 
management not government management (Morone, 1993). 
The shifting roles of new stakeholders in the regulatory process. As the roles of 
government and industry evolve with the shift to cooperative compliance regulation, so too will 
the roles of other stakeholders. Though “the public," which includes environmentalists, 
community groups and other interested parties, were not traditionally a direct party to the 
command-and-control process, they now have a significant and direct role in negotiated 
collaborative agreements between business and government. This “stakeholder effect” has a 
major influence on both HCPs and Project XL, in that public comments clearly influence the 
actors to the negotiation (Noss, O’Connell, and Murphy, 1997; Steinzor, 1998). When 
government acts as arbiter of the rules, there is a natural alignment between the state and the 
public. This alignment is socially constructed and embedded in a long historical context. As the 
government becomes a collaborator with business, a natural shift occurs. Both companies and the 
government must become central facilitators in multi-party stakeholder processes and overcome 
the perceptions of bias that might be created through the engagement of particular stakeholders 
or in the dissemination of information (US EPA, 1998a, 1998b; Spyke, 1999).  
But, in many cases, other stakeholder groups will likely perceive that they must function 
as protectors of the environment, perhaps in the role (actually or perceived to be) abdicated by 
the government. This creates a growing and powerful purpose for non-profit conservation groups 
particularly in the context of ecosystem and watershed management projects (Breckenridge, 
1999). The “public interest representatives” include local governments, academics, impacted 
business interests as well as national and local environmental groups (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
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1992). This new role for previously tangential stakeholders will be unfamiliar and challenging to 
all involved.  
Corporate officials may feel frustrated at dealing with what they perceive to be unrealistic 
expectations of citizen involvement in private operations. “People have misconstrued what the 
stakeholder process is all about,” one Intel manager commented and queried: “Citizens are going 
to make decisions…that are binding on Fortune 500 companies?” (Skrzycki, 1997). If newly 
powerful activists see their role as peripheral to the negotiation process, they may resort to 
disruptive rather than collaborative action.  
Regulators must be cognizant of this unfamiliar position and effectively mediate both the 
disputes between citizen activists and companies seeking relief from the strict letter of the law 
(Geltman and Skroback, 1998) and the proper form and forum for that dispute. "Public interest 
representatives must perceive that their participation (for Project XL) is solicited sincerely, and 
not as political cover for industry negotiations with regulators. They must also be convinced that 
reinvention will, at the very least, maintain environmental quality and possibly deliver 
performance superior to the status quo" (Steinzor, 1998: 201). When they cannot, a new party to 
this process - third-party facilitators - must be introduced to the process to ease the tensions 
between the roles of interested party and process orchestrator (US EPA, 1998a; Blackman and 
Mazurek, 1999). 
In order to be successful, collaborative regulation must create an effective means to 
engage stakeholders in the process of generating new and relevant knowledge. Although often 
identified as a strength of the Project XL program, the management of stakeholder involvement 
became a serious source of contention with critics from both industry and environmental groups 
(Environment Manager, 1998). While some respondents to EPA surveys lauded the “trust and 
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confidence [built] between local community, industry, state, and EPA” and the enhanced quality 
of agreements produced by this more “holistic approach,” others complained about the time 
consumed by the protracted consultation processes and the companies’ asymmetric control over 
processes to which other stakeholder reacted.  
The perceived challenge to the pre-eminence of science. In the shift to cooperative 
compliance, another interest whose role is challenged is that of the scientific community and 
more importantly, the scientific data and conclusions they offer. Historically, environmental 
protection was characterized by such extreme abuses that curbs and controls dictated by clear 
scientific evidence provided a logical means to preventing equally clear environmental threats 
(such as spontaneous combustion on lakes and rivers) (Portney, 1998). The value of scientific 
assessment has assumed the level of psuedo-sacredness discussed earlier. But the past twenty-
five years has witnessed a less assured and more contentious debate over the best science for 
protecting the environment. Both Project XL and HCPs are designed to follow the “best 
available science” but the debate over what is the “best science” has often become politicized; 
seen as shaped by the professions who devise the frameworks, typologies and guidelines (Scott 
and Backman, 1990) that constitute the collective knowledge. 
Debates surrounding the science of climate change, alar, and dioxin all illustrate that we 
increasingly face the reality that environmental problems are more complex and scientific 
knowledge is more subjective and less certain than entrenched interests care to recognize 
(Jasanoff, 1990). Despite the varied opinions, science becomes the “carrier,” a medium for 
exchange of knowledge, that serves to both restrict and enable the behavior of the actors in the 
negotiation (Scott, 1995). The success of collaborative forms of regulation must recognize that 
scientific opinion will become part of the currency of the negotiation. Protecting the real and 
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perceived integrity of scientific analysis will pose a formidable barrier to cooperative 
compliance. 
The perceived incompatibility of economic and environmental goals. Much of 
environment-competitiveness debate is premised on the fixed-pie view that the interests of 
industry and ecology are at odds. Economic and material growth is taken for granted as mutually 
incompatible with environmental concerns. At the core, the prevailing belief is that 
environmental protection must, by its very nature, reduce economic competitiveness (Walley and 
Whitehead, 1994; Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995). This worldview perpetuates the win-lose 
mentality behind environmental advances and restrains parties from seeking opportunities for 
mutual gain through cooperative rule-making such as Project XL and HCPs. Porter and van der 
Linde (1995) argue that this notion of an inevitable struggle is the result of a static view of 
regulation. If one assumes that firms in a static system have made cost minimizing choices, 
regulation clearly raises costs, but if success is measured in terms of continuous innovation that 
creates competitive advantage, a new paradigm emerges. When regulation promotes 
technological advantages that offset compliance costs, firms can gain comparative advantage 
through “innovation offsets.” This argument shifts the focus from the social benefits of 
environmental regulation to the profit maximizing decisions of firms in managing “private costs” 
of compliance. But unfortunately, win-lose perspectives of the economics-environment 
relationship are embedded and perpetuated by many institutions of society, including regulatory 
standards, educational curricula, engineering and operating protocols, and international regimes 
(Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999). 
The challenge of organizational inertia within regulating agencies. One of the goals 
of reinventing regulation is the economic objective of reducing compliance costs for business, 
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while creating efficiencies by streamlining the government bureaucracy. The tension of 
competing political ideals within diffuse large bureaucratic forms contributes to limited and 
incremental change within the federal government (Lindbolm, 1959; Kingdon, 1995). One of the 
goals of reinventing government is directed at “transforming organizational structures” by 
eliminating top-down bureaucracies that are seen as “rigid, hierarchical and segmented” 
(National Performance Review, 1993a, 1993b). The restructuring goals include reducing the size 
of management control positions, increasing span of control, promoting inter-agency 
collaboration and creating self-managing work teams. Although these goals would all appear to 
support collaborative forms of regulation, it must also be acknowledged that this shift involves 
re-thinking what has been engrained within the government bureaucracy over the last thirty 
years. Some may resist this learning process as contrary to their conception of the underlying 
purpose of the agency or as a threat to their own political interests, competencies, skills, or 
personal security. 
The shift from command-and-control to cooperative regulation may be competence 
enhancing for some and competence destroying for others. Staff within enforcement departments 
or specific media based programs may resist the transfer of some of their responsibilities to other 
initiatives since the very act may minimize their own usefulness. In the face of such changes, 
self-preservation may override concerns for environmental or economic objectives in decision 
making. The result may be organizational confusion or battles for survival among rival 
departments. Anne Kelley, former Special Assistant to the Director of the New England Region 
of the EPA was responsible for reinvention efforts and Project XL. “I represented a tiny office 
that came begging for open-mindedness but unfortunately most in the agency locked arms 
against reinvention” (Kelley, 2000). Conversely, without a clear view of the ultimate objective of 
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negotiated compliance, a shortage of available or capable managers may pose additional 
problems resulting in project delays, personnel changes, and shifting standards (Noss, 
O’Connell, and Murphy, 1997; Steinzor, 1998; Marcus, Geffen, and Sexton, 2002). In several 
Project XL negotiations, companies complained that EPA staff assigned to the project lacked the 
authority to make decisions or to speak for their agencies, and that they commanded insufficient 
resources (e.g., travel budget) to support the project adequately. Inappropriate staff assignments 
and government team turnover produced frustrating delays from companies’ perspectives (US 
EPA, 1998b).  
In 1999, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) called attention to this 
organizational inertia, pointing out that the current regulatory system has "led to, and tends to 
reinforce, many of the existing practices and behaviors that EPA is seeking to change ... the 
agency faces several challenges, including helping its rank-and-file employees to understand and 
support changes to the current regulatory system and obtaining consensus among the agency’s 
varied stakeholders on what these changes should be" (US GAO, 1999: 27). In analyzing Project 
XL specifically, another GAO report concluded that the most important obstacles to the program 
were (a) the difficulty of obtaining commitment from agency staff. The staff were accustomed to 
medium-by-medium approaches and reluctant to abandon them and (b) the difficulty of obtaining 
universal endorsement from stakeholders. Because EPA was concerned about litigation, it was 
disinclined to move forward unless it had complete stakeholder backing (US GAO, 1977).  
The need for certainty among landowners/corporations and the need for flexibility 
under changing scientific opinion. There is an inherent conflict within the form of negotiated 
compliance programs between the interests of market certainty and the interests of scientific 
advancement. Companies seek certainty in the market and regulatory environment so as to make 
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long-term investment and market forecasts. Environmental advocates and regulating agencies 
seek flexibility in responding to newly emerging environmental threats as scientific analysis 
reveals them. Command-and-control regulations have established a known and understood 
method for providing both. They dictate clear standards for compliance and an established 
process for changing those standards. Since Project XL and HCPs change both these 
considerations, corporations may prefer "the devil they know to the devil they don't know." 
Negotiated policy development can degrade into a contest between how much certainty will be 
granted versus how much environmental protection will be extracted. The cooperative spirit of 
the program degenerates into another type of win-lose negotiation.  
For example, Project XL suffered its first major setback in 1996 when 3M abandoned 
negotiations because it claimed EPA had demanded guarantees so stringent as to provide the 
company with little or no margin of error (Environment Manager, 1996). The EPA was criticized 
for failing “to entrust 3M, a company with a proven record of exemplary environmental 
performance, to take on the responsibility and accountability of proving that Project XL will 
result in superior environmental performance” and for under-weighting other issues such as 
economic benefits, administrative cost-savings, and increased stakeholder engagement (Harris, 
1996b: 1). In response, the EPA argued that if the facilities were to be granted the license for 
regulatory flexibility, they must provide a guaranteed level of "superior environmental 
performance" (SEP) - the greater the economic benefit the greater SEP required. The negotiation 
ultimately failed because each side could not agree on a definition of SEP and because 3M did 
not offer EPA enough guaranteed SEP to justify the flexibility the company was seeking 
(Marcus, Geffen, and Sexton, 2002: 221). At a time when the EPA most needed to build trust 
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and confidence with its corporate partners, it was being accused of being completely out of touch 
with the competitive business realities (Harris, 1996b). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have highlighted an important point about new forms of regulatory 
cooperation. Programs such as Project XL or HCPs represent more than just the implementation 
of a new rule change. They represent a shift in the values that underlie both how the process of 
regulation is to be employed and how the roles of the many parties involved will change. The 
values underlying these shifts may be at odds with the taken-for-granted values that have 
developed over the past thirty years. The roles of government, industry, science, and society at 
large as well as the form of their interaction will be altered and many will respond by resisting 
such change. This resistance is inevitable and must be expected until the process is legitimized. 
The past thirty years of regulatory history has developed forms of cognitive and social inertia 
that cannot be overlooked. We cannot expect this inertia to be broken down without persistent 
efforts to combat the cognitive and institutional barriers that underlie individual and societal 
sources of resistance. Identifying these barriers has been the objective of this paper.  
By exposing the sources of cognitive and institutional resistance, we begin to understand 
why programs such as Project XL and HCPs do not emerge as dominant forms and spread 
rapidly across the policy landscape. Although long-awaited and widely recognized as the path to 
the future, these types of negotiated solutions present fundamental challenges to the ways in 
which we as individuals think about environmental management problems and to the institutions 
our society has developed to resolve them. Fundamental change processes — which we argue 
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Project XL and HCPs represent — require time and friction to break down and reconstruct value 
systems and taken for granted beliefs.  
At the individual level, we have to change the way we think about problems in order to 
recognize potential blind spots in our own perspectives and to realize the potential for more 
efficient solutions. At the organizational and societal level, we have to overcome the stasis 
created by bureaucratic inertia and myopic risk aversion and boldly restructure the roles of actors 
in the policy arena. Agency regulators and company managers must shift from being rule 
enforcers and compliers (sometimes avoiders), respectively, to trusting collaborators in the 
development of innovative environmental policy solutions. Private as well as public-sector 
managers must be recognized for their potential to become the next generation of policy 
entrepreneurs. We must find a new, more engaged role for interested and affected parties in the 
development of these policy solutions, but one which balances the importance of information 
disclosure and public participation with the rights of proprietorship. We must push the bounds of 
existing scientific knowledge and traditional approaches to the study of environmental problems. 
Where necessary, existing standards must be broken-down and adjusted to new metrics for 
success whose explicit objective is to maximize the economic and environmental values. 
In looking to the future, we must adjust our metrics for determining the success or failure 
of these groundbreaking programs. The adoption of a dominant design follows a contagion 
pattern as depicted in Figure 6. At the early stages of a competing policy design like Project XL 
or HCPs, acceptance rates are low. Few companies will be expected to participate as the benefits 
are unclear and the outcomes unknown. But, as acceptance grows, a threshold effect occurs 
where adoption is rapid until dominance occurs. If this model is to be applied to the 
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environmental regulatory context, then we propose that the efforts behind collaborative variants 
must strive to reach that threshold point.  
 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 
An important factor in this effort is understanding the differences between organizations 
that adopt early in this process and those that adopt late, as depicted in Figure 7. Dominant 
designs are not known ex ante, but firms that attempt to promote them are willing to take the 
risks inherent in eras of ferment. They are not merely organizations that have positive 
environmental records. Such firms must be highly entrepreneurial, willing to learn-by-doing and 
thus, actively shape technology and policy cycles (Tushman, Anderson, and O’Reilly, 1997). 
They are outliers in the environmental arena, seeking to differentiate through innovation and gain 
competitive advantage from opportunities in environmental strategies. Conversely, those that 
adopt at the threshold or after are more risk averse. They do not seek differentiation on 
environmental issues and prefer the predictability of traditional regulatory structures to the 
uncertainty of new programs. Targeting the proper type of participating firm is critical for 
minimizing failures and maximizing successes towards reaching the threshold point. 
 
Insert Figure 7 here 
 
Overall, to gain ultimate acceptance of collaborative programs, regulatory officials must 
understand the types of value- based sources of inertia that will create resistance to change. They 
must identify the types of organizational outliers that seek to shape the institutional environment 
and adopt multiple internal perspectives (as enforcers and innovators) to manage the policy 
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innovation process (Tushman, Anderson, and O’Reilly, 1997). For these changes to be lasting, 
we must resolve the value conflicts that form these sources of resistance. We must develop the 
trust among government agents, company managers, and citizen activists and help them to move 
from being the principal parties engaged in adversarial conflict to the principal parties engaged in 
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